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Entering the Fog: On the Borderlines of Mental Capacity
JONATHAN HERRING*
INTRODUCTION
Professor George P. Smith II, in whose name this lecture is held, has a world-wide
reputation as a scholar of medical law and ethics. His work manages, unusually, to
combine the qualities of being vast in quantity and rich in quality.' His abilities as a
scholar are fortunately matched by his compassion as a person. One area of his work
that is of particular of interest to me relates to the law and older people. He brings a
keen mind, a sensitivity to the issues raised, and an outrage at mistreatment of older
people that combine to produce a powerful contribution to the literature on elder law.2
His writings on the issues of older people and autonomy 3 especially drew me to the
topic of this lecture.
This article considers issues of legal competency raised by individuals who possess
borderline mental capacity.4 This involves thinking about two categories of
individuals: (1) those assessed as possessing capacity, but only just;5 and (2) those
assessed as lacking capacity, but only just. Finding a patient of uncertain competence
is common. Practitioners report that even the most seasoned experts in the field can
struggle to determine a person's decision-making ability.6 As Professor Gunn has
pointed out, capacity and incapacity are not "concepts with clear a priori boundaries.
They appear on a continuum .... There are, therefore, degrees of capacity."7
These issues are particularly significant for patients suffering from Alzheimer's
Disease or other forms of dementia. 8 It would, of course, be quite wrong to suggest tat
* Fellow in Law, Exeter College, University of Oxford. I originally presented a version of
this article at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington on September 12, 2007, when I
served as the George P. Smith II Distinguished Visiting Professor-Chair.
1. See, e.g., GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: A
SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLED DECISION-MAKING (2005); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FAMILY VALUES AND
THE NEW SOCIETY: DILEMMAS OF THE 21ST CENTURY (1998); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND BIOMEDICINE (2000); GEORGE P. SMITH, IH, LEGAL AND HEALTHCARE ETHICS FOR
THE ELDERLY (1996) [hereinafter SMITH, ETHICS].
2. See, e.g., George P. Smith, II., The Elderly and Patient Dumping, 73 FLA. BAR J. 85
(1999).
3. Especially SMrrH, ETHICS supra note 1.
4. In this article, the terms "competence" and "capacity" are used interchangeably. Some
lawyers suggest that the two terms have different meanings in that competence/incompetence is
a legal standard, while capacity/incapacity refer to facts about a patient's abilities, although
there is no consistency in this usage. See Philip Bielby, The Conflation of Competence and
Capacity in English Medical Law: A Philosophical Critique, 8 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 357
(2005).
5. The term "mild cognitive impairment" is sometimes used to describe those who possess
borderline mental capacity, although its use is controversial. Jullian C. Hughes, The Heat of
Mild Cognitive Impairment 13 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 1 (2006).
6. Roger C. Jones & Timothy Holden, A Guide to Assessing Decision-Making Capacity,
12 CLEVELAND CLINICAL J. MED. 971 (2004).
7. Michael Gunn, The Meaning of Incapacity, 2 MED. L. REv. 8, 9 (1994).
8. For a non-technical discussion of the impact of Alzheimer's Disease, see JOHN BAYLEY,
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a diagnosis of dementia means that a patient automatically lacks capacity.9 It is
perfectly possible, for example, to suffer from Alzheimer's Disease and yet retain full
capacity.' 0 However, the loss of cognitive faculties, difficulties with memory,
communication problems and depression associated with Alzheimer's may contribute
to a gradual loss of capacity. 1" For many Alzheimer's sufferers, there will be a period
of time when their degree of competence is unknown.
Basic Legal Principles
The central legal issues in this area are similar in both American and English law.
Both legal traditions draw a clear and strong line is drawn between the law governing
those who have capacity and those who do not. Indeed, textbooks on medical law often
contain separate chapters on each. 
2
For those who possess legal capacity, the cardinal principle is the right of self-
determination or autonomy.' 3 Subject to the constraints of the law, people remain
generally free to live their lives as they wish. The government may not prevent us from
acting as we choose nor compel us to act against our will. It is not for the state to tell
us we would be better off reading poetry or train timetables instead of law reports. This
view sounds in the right to bodily integrity-the right for our bodies not to be touched
or interfered with without our consent. 14 Unfortunately, the English judiciary does not
quote its American counterpart with appropriate frequency. However, Judge Cardozo's
famous quotation about bodily integrity has entered the U.K. legal canon15 :
ELEGY FOR IRIS (1999); ANN DAVIDSON, ALZHEIMER'S, A LOVE STORY: ONE YEAR IN MY
HUSBAND'S JOURNEY (1997). For a more academic discussion, see JULIAN C. HUGHES, STEPHEN
J. Louw & STEVEN R. SABAT, DEMENTIA: MIND, MEANING AND THE PERSON (2005).
9. Linda Clare, The Construction ofAwareness in Early-Stage Alzheimer's Disease: A
Review of Concepts and Models, 43 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 155 (2004); Leslie Pickering
Francis, Decision-Making at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer's or Other Dementias, 35
GA. L. REV. 539 (2001); Bob Woods & Rebecca Pratt, Awareness in Dementia: Ethical and
Legal Issues in Relation to People with Dementia, 9 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 423 (2005).
10. Seena Fazel, Tony Hope & Robin Jacoby, Dementia, Intelligence, and the Competence
to Complete Advance Directives, 454 LANCET 48 (1999).
11. For a discussion of attempts to maximize capacity among those with dementia, see
Susan Slaughter & Jane Bankes, The Functional Transitions Model: Maximizing Ability in the
Context of Progressive Disability Associated with Alzheimer's Disease, 26 CAN. J. AGING 39
(2007).
12. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL LAW (Andrew Grubb ed., 2d ed. 2004) (Chapter 3
concerns the competent patient and Chapter 4 concerns the incompetent patient.).
13. DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW 1-35 (2007).
14. The right to bodily integrity is an essential component of the right to liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990); Union Pac. RR. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
15. R (Burke) v. Gen. Med. Council, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 1879 (Eng.); R (Pretty) v.
Dir. of Public Prosecutions, [2001] UKHL 61 (Eng.); Re A (Children), [2001] 2 WLR 480
(Eng.); Friend v. Civil Aviation Auth. 5 Feb 1998 The Times; Sec. of State of the Home Dep't
v. Robb [1995] Fam. 127 (Eng.); Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789 (Eng.); Re T
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [ 1993] Fam. 95 (Eng.); Re R (A Minor)(Wardship: Consent to
Treatment) [1992] Fain. 11 (Eng.); Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization) [1990] 2 A.C. 1 (Eng.);
Sidaway v. Bd. of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hosp. [1985] A.C. 871.
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Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent, commits an assault .... 16
English judges have emphasized that the right not to be treated against your will may
be exercised even if the reasons for the decision are "rational, irrational, unknown or
even non-existent."' 7 The right exists even if the decision will lead to death. '8
For those who lack mental capacity, the guiding principles are very different. Their
consent is not required before medical treatment is administered. Instead others make
decisions on behalf of persons who lack mental capacity based on what is perceived to
be in their best interests.' 9 The parens patriae jurisdiction in Anglo-American
jurisprudence protects those who lack mental capacity from harming themselves. 20
The question whether a person possesses mental capacity is therefore "critical.'
Consider the English decision In re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment).22 C was a patient
at a secure hospital. Doctors diagnosed C with paranoid schizophrenia and found he
had a number of delusional beliefs, including a belief that he was a great doctor who
had a 100 percent record of restoring injured limbs. Ironically, C suffered an injury to
his foot that developed gangrene. His doctors informed him there was an eighty-five
percent chance he would die if the foot were not amputated. C disagreed; believing that
God would heal him of any medical problems. The court found C to be competent and
to possess mental capacity. The court reasoned that C understood the doctors'
prognosis, but that he disagreed with them. His disagreement did not render him
incompetent. C was able to comprehend and retain the information that his doctors told
him, and to reach a decision based on that information. The fact that many would find
his decision bizarre or irrational does not mean that he should have been judged
incompetent. As an adult possessing mental capacity, C had the right to refuse
treatment and the doctors were therefore forbidden by the court from amputating his
gangrenous foot. Had C been deemed incompetent, no doubt the court would have
judged the amputation operation to be in C's best interest. 23
This case had a happy ending. Predictably, perhaps, C's foot made a surprising
recovery. Whether this was due to C's great medical skill or divine intervention we
may never know!
16. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
17. In re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1993] Farn. 95 (Eng.); see also Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous.
L. REv. 15 (1991).
18. R (Burke) v. Gen. Med. Council, [2005] EWCA 1003 (Eng.) at 61(approving Munby,
J. in R (Burke) v. Gen. Med. Council, [20041 EWHC 1879 (Admin)).
19. Although quite what "best interests" mean in this context is hotly debated.
20. NoRMAN L. CANTOR, MAKING MEDICAL DECISIONS FOR THE PROFOUNDLY DISABLED I
(MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2005).
21. See In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Autonomy and
Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 321 (2003).
22. [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290 (Fam.) (Eng.).
23. In re W (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment), (2000] EWHC 901(Fam.) (Eng.), a
prisoner was found to have capacity to refuse treatment even though he was convinced there
was a conspiracy against him.
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On the Edges of the Two Categories
The law draws a sharp line between those who are competent and those who are
not. Fall on the side of competence and your right to autonomy requires that your
decisions be respected. Fall on the side of incapacity and the decision is made on your
behalf by others. This creates difficulties for those on the borderline of mental
competence. Imagine a person in the early stages of dementia. Let's call him Albert.
Albert's character has already started to change. Prior to the onset of his condition he
opposed the drinking of alcohol with vehemence and promoted and practiced a most
conservative sexual ethic. With the onset of his illness, however, he has suddenly taken
to getting drunk and visiting prostitutes. Both of these activities are expensive; before
the onset of his condition he was most prudent in his expenses. His wife and other
relatives are concerned for his well-being. Albert's doctors accept that his case is not a
straight-forward one, but they are persuaded that he just about had capacity to make
decisions about his lifestyle.
The legal principles that apply to Albert are those that apply to anyone who has
mental capacity. Albert may freely engage in activities of his choice, however harmful
these activities may be, and however irrational his decisions may seem in light of the
way he lived his life prior to the onset of dementia. Many find such a case troubling.
Should Albert be left alone while he loses capacity and engages in activities that may
cause himself and his family serious harm and that appear to go against the values he
held dear? Does Albert's right to autonomy mean that there should be no legal means
to prevent him acting in this way?
Imagine a different kind of case. Martha suffers from a more developed dementia
than Albert. She retains no memory of her life, and cannot recall her family, although
they visit her regularly. Martha's doctors assess her generally to lack capacity,
although it is a close call. Throughout her life Martha was a vehement atheist, but
recently she makes her way to the chapel at the retirement home where she lives and
attends Mass. It is unclear how much Martha understands about what is going on at the
chapel, but she seems to receive pleasure by going there. Her shocked relatives have
asked the staff to ensure that Martha is prevented from going to chapel. They are sure
she would never have wanted to be involved in religious activity. When the staff stop
Martha from going to the chapel, she becomes distressed and agitated. Since Martha's
doctors judged her to lack capacity, the law states that the decision whether to allow
her to attend Mass is made based on what is in Martha's best interest, taking into
account the values she held prior to the onset of dementia. This could mean that
Martha would be prevented from attending Mass.2 4 Is this a correct approach or should
Martha's current views, however incompetent, be taken into account?
Before addressing such questions in more detail, the following section makes a few
points about how cases like Albert's and Martha's are handled in "real life."
24. Of course, the best interest test may not reach this conclusion but instead decide that it
would promote her welfare to attend the services.
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Practical Point
Although the issues raised by the cases examined above are of great practical
importance, they rarely enter the courts. Finding the exact balance between respecting
autonomy and protecting the best interests of those of doubtful capacity presents a
daily problem for practitioners and caretakers. However, they generally "bumble
through. 25 Unsurprisingly, relying on lawyers for solutions is not regarded as being
particularly helpful. In part, this may be because the relevant legal principles do not
seem appropriate for the day-to-day issues that arise.
In the real world, despite the legal niceties, caretakers who make decisions on
behalf of people lacking capacity often do allow them to do what they want to do, even
if that may not be in their best interests.26 For a caretaker to constantly protect an
incompetent person from harming themselves would be an intolerable burden,
impractical, and humiliating for the patient. To force caretakers to constantly promote
the best interests of each patient in every decision may be an unrealistic standard for
the law to set.27 Further, even if a person is assessed as just having capacity, caretakers
and professionals do intervene to prevent them from committing acts that would cause
them serious harm. Empirical evidence indicates that medical professionals regularly
rely on the consent of non-competent people.28 As long as the patient is compliant
there is no need for caretakers to question the patient's competence. As one leading
medical law textbook states, "typically, competence is questioned only when a patient
refuses to consent to a recommended treatment or chooses a course different from the
one the doctor finds most reasonable." 29 In Lane v. Candura, 30 a woman required
treatment for gangrene in her leg. Initially, she consented to treatment and preparations
were made for the surgery. She then changed her mind and refused to consent. Only
then were concerns about her capacity raised and legal intervention sought. As this
case shows, if the patient appears to be compliant issues of competency may be
overlooked
31
25. Marshall B. Kapp, Decisional Capacity in Theory and Practice: Legal Process Versus
"Bumbling Through," 6 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 413 (2002).
26. R. Jones, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Care of People with Dementia, 11 REV. IN
CLINICAL GERONTOLOGY 245 (2001).
27. For further arguments that apply to parents and children, see Jonathan Herring, The
Human Rights Act and the Welfare Principle in Family Law-Conflicting and Complementary?,
11 CHILD & FAMILY L.Q. 223 (1999) (promoting a particular understanding of best interests, that
is "relationship-based welfare," which requires a consideration of the issue at hand in the
context of the relationship between the parties).
28. Vanessa Raymont, William Bingley, Alec Buchanan, Anthony S. David, Peter
Hayward, Simon Wesseley & Matthew Hotopfa, Prevalence of Mental Incapacity in Medical
Inpatients and Associated Risk Factors: Cross Sectional Study, 364 LANCET 1421 (2004).
29. GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 652 (1990).
30. 376 N.E. 2d (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
31. One explanation for the use of a higher test in practice is that where the decision
appears bizarre it is more likely the decision will be challenged in court and therefore the
medical practitioner will want to do be doubly sure that the finding of capacity is beyond
question. See Alec Buchanan, Mental Capacity, Legal Competence and Consent to Treatment,
97 J. ROYAL Soc'YoF MED. 415 (2004).
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This article aims to set legal standards that better reflect what actually happens in
practice, and provide more realistic, and therefore effective, guidance for practitioners
and caretakers.
The Test for Capacity
The search for a single test for legal competency has been said to be like the search
for the Holy Grail.32 In the United States, the assessment of legal competency is seen
as largely one for physicians, rather than lawyers. 33 In England, the assessment is seen
as a matter of law, although judges normally rely heavily upon the evidence of
experts.34 Nevertheless common principles emerge among the definitions of
competence: 
35
1. A presumption exists in favor of a person having capacity. 36
2. Competence means one possesses an ability to understand one's current medical
condition, the possible treatments, the risks associated with those treatments, and
their consequences. 
37
3. One must possess the ability to use relevant information in a rational way to
reach a decision. 38
4. One must be able to communicate one's decision. 39
32. L.H. Roth, A. Meisel & C.W. Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 293 (1977). For a useful analysis of different tests that have been used
see M.J. Gunn, J.G. Wong, I.C.H. Clare & A.J. Holland, Decision Making Capacity, 7 MED. L.
REV. 296 (1999); Samantha Weyrauch, Comment, Decision Makingfor Incompetent Patients:
Who Decides and by What Standards?, 35 TULSA L.J. 765 (2000)
33. Ron Berghmans, Donna Dickenson & Ruud Ter Meulen, Mental Capacity: In Search of
Alternative Perspectives, 12 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 251 (2004).
34. BRITISH MED. Ass'N, ASSESSMENT OF MENTAL CAPACITY: GuiDANcE FOR DOCTORS AND
LAWYERS (2d ed. 2004). But see Michel Silberfeld & David Checkland, Faulty Judgment,
Expert Opinion, and Decision-Making Capacity, 20 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 377
(1999) (expressing skepticism at the effectiveness of experts in assessing competence.).
35. Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing Competence:
Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
345 (1996).
36. For the U.K. law, see Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, s. 1(2). For the U.S. law, see
Winick, supra note 17, at 21-27.
37. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-J:2 (V) (2005) ("Capacity to make health care decisions
means the ability to understand and appreciate generally the nature and consequences of a
health care, including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable alternatives to any
proposed health care.").
38. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-66-20(6) (2005) ("'Unable to consent' means unable to
appreciate the nature and implications of the patient's condition and proposed health care, to
make a reasoned decision concerning the proposed health care, or to communicate that decision
in an unambiguous manner.").
39. Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, s. 3(1) (Eng.); see also Mo. REv. STAT. § 404.805.1(2)
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As these principles indicate, a person may be found to possess mental capacity to
make some decisions, but not others. 40 A person may, for example, have the requisite
mental capacity to decide to prefer strawberry ice cream to chocolate ice cream, but
lack the requisite capacity to execute a will.
Both legal systems emphasize that the determination of legal competence should not
rest on the wisdom of the person's decision. Even sane people make foolish decisions.
The English Mental Capacity Act of 2005 makes this explicit: "A person is not to be
treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision".41
Of course, as the word "merely" in the statute indicates, the fact that a decision is
widely regarded as bizarre may indicate that a patient is incompetent, but further
evidence is required. Despite the court's insistence that it does not do this, academics
on both sides of the Atlantic have accused their respective judiciaries of finding a
patient incompetent simply because the judges disagreed with the decision that the
patient had made.42
It should be emphasized that the definition of incapacity and its use is not
uncontroversial. Women and ethnic minorities remain particularly vulnerable to
assessments that they lack mental capacity.43 It has been argued that while notions of
competence purport to be neutral, these notions in fact reflect majority interests and
values. 44 Assessments of capacity may hide the subjective values of physicians,
especially when an emotional end-of-life issue is involved.45
Outlining the Approach of This Article
Having set the scene and covered some introductory material, I will now outline this
article. First, in section one of this article, I will consider people deemed just
competent. I will make a strong case for not following the wishes of those who are just
competent, where what they want to do will cause them serious harm or go against
values they have held dear during their life. In section two, I will discuss how the law
should treat the opinions of those who are found to lack capacity. I will argue that the
best interests test fails to place adequate weight on their views. In section three, I will
discuss advance directives and their role in dealings with the incompetent. In section
four, I will make some points in the broader context of the legal treatment of those
suffering from dementia.
(2006); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.505(13) (2006).
40. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING (1990).
41. Mental Capacity Act 2005, s. 1(3) (England).
42. Alastair R. Maclean, Caesarean Sections, Competence and the Illusion ofAutonomy,
WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/issuel/macleanl.html; Ben A.
Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respect for Patient Autonomy: The More Things Change the
More They Remain the Same, 10 MICH. ST. UNIV. J. MED. & L. 87 (2006).
43. Judith Mosoff, Motherhood Madness and Law, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 107 (1995); Peggy
Foster, Informed Consent in Practice, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE LAw 53
(Sally Sheldon & Michael Thomson eds., 1998).
44. Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests ofAutonomy
and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2003).
45. Susan R. Martyn and Henry J. Bourguignon, Physicians' Decisions About Patient
Capacity: The Trojan Horse of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 388
(2000).
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I. THOSE DEEMED JUST COMPETENT
There are two main kinds of cases in which families and professionals may raise
concerns about the behaviour of a person found just competent. The hypothetical case
of Albert, discussed previously, highlights both of these cases. The first kind of case
involves a person that wishes to embark on a course of action which will cause the
person significant harm. The second kind of situation involves a person who seeks to
engage in uncharacteristic behaviour that would be contrary to the values upon which
the person's former life was built.
As discussed previously, the standard legal approach provides that once a person is
judged to possess the requisite mental capacity, that person must be treated with as
much respect as any competent person and, therefore, that person's decisions must be
respected. A competent person is free to engage in harmful activities if he or she
wishes. Indeed, nearly everyone chooses to engage in activities which are harmful. We
all have our vices! Furthermore, competent adults are free to change their minds about
issues and take up new hobbies and interests, even if previously they would not have
espoused them. I am sure we are all relieved we are not stuck with the views and
interests of our late teens. However, I will argue that the standard legal approach to
determining mental capacity is insufficiently subtle to effectively deal with these
issues.
When a person chooses to engage in an activity that carries a significant risk of
harm, or when a person repudiates a long-held belief, that person's original assessment
of competence should be re-examined. This is not a controversial position. I argue,
however, that even if the reassessment leads to a conclusion of competency, the
person's views should not necessarily be followed because of the principle of
autonomy.
A. Autonomy and Harmful Decisions
First, I consider cases where the just competent person wants to make a decision
that is going to cause that person serious harm. Must the decision be respected once it
is determined that they are indeed competent? Some commentators argue that it should
not be respected, relying on the notion of "risk-relative capacity". I will discuss this
notion, although I will suggest it is not a completely convincing approach.
The "risk-relative capacity" approach requires a higher standard of competency
where an act poses a serious risk of great harm than is the required where the decision
involves less harm.46 Professors Strang, Molloy, and Harrison suggest that when
considering harm in this context, practitioners may take into account "the degree of
risk to the person, the risks to others, and the indirect consequences to society. '4 7 They
46. ALLEN E. BuCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING (1990); James F. Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, 15
HASTINGS CTR REP. 17 (1985).
47. D. Strang, D.W. Molloy & C. Harrison, Capacity to Choose Place of Residence:
Autonomy vs Beneficence?, 14 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 25, 26 (1998); see also James L. Werth Jr.,
Requests for Physician-Assisted Death: GuidelinesforAssessing Mental Capacity and Impaired
Judgment, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 348 (2000).
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argue that a sliding scale of capacity exists that depends on the risk of harm associated
with a decision.4 8 The higher the risk of harm, the higher the bar of competence is set.
Before examining this argument, a point of clarification should be made. As
mentioned at the start of this article, a person may be found to be competent for some
purposes but not for others. For example, a person of limited capacity may be able to
make simple decisions, but not difficult ones. Of course, many decisions that could
cause serious harm involve consideration of difficult issues. It is uncontroversial to
claim that a person of restricted capacity may not have capacity to make a decision
because it is complex. 49 Supporters of risk-relative capacity argue that if two decisions
are equally complex but one involves a highly risky activity and the other does not, a
different level of competency should be set for each decision.
There are several difficulties associated with "risk-relative capacity".50 First,
whether a patient is deemed competent to make a particular decision may depend upon
the decision they reach. 51 Imagine that a patient is offered a life-saving treatment. If
the refusal to consent may cause the patient serious harm, the risk-relative capacity
approach requires a stringent test for capacity. If however, the patient consents to the
treatment, then the risk of harm is significantly reduced and, therefore, the test for
capacity is easier to satisfy.52 A person of borderline capacity may, therefore, have the
capacity to consent to a particular treatment, but not to refuse it. Objectors counter that
it is illogical to find that a person has capacity to make a decision if they say "yes"; but
not if they say "no."
Second, the risk relative capacity approach involves a conflation of two issues: (1)
whether a person has capacity to make a decision, and (2) whether or not a person's
decision may ever be overruled on paternalistic grounds. 53 Varying the test for
capacity because we do not like (or might not like) the answer given by the patient
disguises the real issue, some argue. 54 If the real reason why we wish not to respect a
person's decision is that we do not agree with it, then we should be open about doing
this. Describing the issue as one concerning capacity, is misleading. Further, this
position sits unhappily with the view that a person's decision is worthy of respect even
if it is considered unwise by others. As Nancy Knauer has argued, "risk-relative
capacity has the potential to become the ultimate self-fulfilling doctrine: those who
48. Marc Tunzi, Can the Patient Decide? Evaluating Patient Capacity in Practice, 64 Am.
FAMILY PHYSICIAN 299 (2001).
49. Tom Buller, Competence and Risk-Relativity, 15 BioETIcs 93 (2001); Mark R.
Wicclair, The Continuing Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence, 13 BIoETHIcs
149 (1999).
50. Joseph DeMarco, Competence and Paternalism, 16 BioETcs 231 (2002); Gita S. Cale,
Continuing the Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence, 13 BIOETHICS 131 (1999).
51. Mark R. Wicclair, The Continuing Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence,
13 BioETHics 149 (1999); Ian Wilks, The Debate Over Risk-Related Standards of Competence,
11 BioETHics 413 (1997).
52. Wilks, supra note 51. Contra Cale, supra note 50.
53. Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert, The Inadequacy of Incompetence, 68 MILBANK Q.
619 (1990); Tom Buller, Competence and Risk-Relativity, 15 BioETHIcs 93 (2001).
54. Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests ofAutonomy
and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 321 (2003).
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exercise approved choices have capacity, whereas those who exercise socially
undesirable choices lack capacity. ' 55
Though the objections to the risk-relative capacity approach are compelling, they
should not lead to a rejection of the concept out of hand. When considering how to
respond to a case where a person wishes to do something that will cause harm, it is
important to balance the values of preventing harm and respecting autonomy. 56 When
these are two values are weighed, normally, autonomy will win out. However, when
the risk of very serious harm is present, then the scales become more evenly
balanced.57 So, a decision made by a fully autonomous person will always weigh
heavily, but the decision of a barely competent person is lighter. Therefore, only a fully
autonomous decision wins the balancing exercise against the risk of serious harm.
58
This is not as radical as it might at first appear. The law often erects procedural barriers
around important decisions (for example, marriage; the purchase of land), in part, to
ensure that the decision is not a flippant one.
The difficulty with the above stated argument in favor of the risk-relative capacity
approach is the way it is presented. To say the level of capacity changes with the
degree of risk is misleading. The weight attached to a decision under the principle of
autonomy does not depend alone on whether or not the individual satisfies the
competence test. Not all autonomous decisions carry the same weight. To understand
this point, it is important to consider what it is about the nature of autonomy causes us
to attach such weight to an autonomous decision.
We treasure autonomy and the power it gives us to shape our lives according to our
own values. That we should be free to fashion our lives and live out our version of the
"good life" is seen as a fundamental aspect of humanity. 59 Autonomy enables us to
develop and express our characters and beliefs.6° Ronald Dworkin explains:
[A]utonomy makes each of us responsible for shaping his own life according to
some coherent and distinctive sense of character, conviction, and interest. It allows
us to lead our own lives rather than being led along them, so that each of us can
be, to the extent a scheme of rights can make this possible, what he has made
himself. This view of autonomy focuses not on individual decisions one by one,
but the place of each decision in a more general program or picture of life the
agent is creating and constructing, a conception of character and achievement that
must bellowed its own distinctive integrity.
61
I discuss autonomy later in this article, but for now, an important point to appreciate
is that where a person is going to make a decision that severely restricts his or her
55. Id. at 343.
56. Wilks, supra note 51.
57Indeed, for most commentators there becomes a point when autonomy may not be respected.
If you wish to remove all your limbs in political protest, the law in many jurisdictions will
prevent you from doing so. See JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHics 123 (2006).
58. Daniel Callahan, Terminating Life-Sustaining Treatment of the Demented, 25 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 26 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80
CAL. L. REv. 857 (1992).
59. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
60. Kadish, supra note 58.
61. Ronald Dworkin, Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK Q. 4, 8 (1986).
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options as to how to live life, supporters of autonomy are properly concerned because
doing so involves an exercise of autonomy now which will limit their autonomy later
in life. We may be convinced that the decision is a genuine part of the person's life
vision and, made with a full understanding of the consequences. Then we can justify
respecting the person's decision to take the risk. Where, however, we are uncertain
whether the decision has been fully thought through with a full understanding of the
consequences, we may decide to attach less weight to the decision. This should not
necessarily been seen as disrespecting autonomy, but rather preserving it for future use.
A key issue then, where a person wishes to engage in an act that will cause them harm,
is whether the act is a full exercise of autonomy. That is, whether the decision reflects
beliefs that are central to the person and are an expression of identity. Where they are,
they deserve respect; where they are not, then they count for less and it may be that the
argument for restricting autonomy now in order to maximize autonomy later is
overwhelming.
Therefore, in a case like Albert's, where a person lies on the borderline of
incapacity, but wishes to engage in behavior that may be harmful to himself, it may
properly be said that although competent, his decision does not reflect a decision based
on a higher-order preference. The harm risked, with its consequent impact on
autonomy later, is such that autonomy requires the decision not to be respected.
B. Autonomy and Decisions Contrary to the Individual's Previous Values
Can the fact that a decision appears bizarre, given the individual's values and ideals
up until that point in life, itself be evidence of incapacity? The orthodox view on this is
clear-it cannot. The assessment of incapacity should be independent of any
assessment of whether a patient is making a wise or sensible decision. 62 Professor Ian
Kennedy argues
If the beliefs and values of the patient, though incomprehensible to others, are of
long standing and have formed the basis for all the patient's decisions about is life,
there is a strong argument to suggest that the doctor should respect and give effect
to a patient's decision based on them .... To argue otherwise would effectively
be to rob the patient of his right to his own personality which may be far more
serious and destructive than anything that could follow from the patient's decision
as regards a particular proposed treatment. 6
3
Indeed, if a person would be assessed as incompetent because she wished to make a
bizarre or even mistaken decision then autonomy would be robbed of much of its
value. A right of self-determination that only allowed one to make well-reasoned,
careful decisions would be of limited value. Indeed, the right to be able to make
mistakes is an essential part of autonomy. 64 As Jonathan Glover explains:
62. M. Parker, Competence by Consequence: Ambiguity and Incoherence in the Law, 25
MED. & L. 1 (2006).
63. IAN KENNEDY, TREAT ME RIGHT: ESSAYS IN MEDICAL LAW AND ETHics (1988).
64. John Eekelaar, The Emergence of Children's Rights, 6 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 161, 182
(1986) ("[T]hat most dangerous but most precious of rights: the right to make their own
mistakes.").
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For many of us would not be prepared to surrender our autonomy with respect to
the major decisions of our life, even if by doing so our other satisfactions were
greatly increased. There are some aspects of life where a person may be delighted
to hand over decisions to someone else more likely to bring about the best results.
When buying a second-hand car, I would happily delegate the decision to someone
more knowledgeable. But there are many other decisions which people would be
reluctant to delegate even if there were the same prospect of greater long-term
satisfaction. Some of these decisions are relatively minor but concern ways of
expressing individuality .... Even in small things, people can mind more about
expressing themselves than about the standard of the result. And, in the main
decisions of life, this is even more so.
65
This is persuasive, but this explanation does not require us to follow the views of
the English courts and some academics that a decision is worthy of respect even if the
reasons for the decision are "irrational, unknown or even non-existent." 66
Philosophers debate whether to which in order to be autonomous, a person must be
able to reflect on his or her desires and preferences, be capable of changing these
desires in response to "higher-order values," or be free from irrational, neurotic or
futile desires. 67 Few take the view that all decisions of persons with capacity are to be
respected by the principle of autonomy. Marilyn Friedman has argued that to be a
decision that requires respect under the principle of autonomy, the decision must be
"self-reflective." This includes two requirements. First, she explains that:
what autonomy requires . . .is the absence of effective coercion, deception,
manipulation, or anything else that interferes significantly with someone's
behaving in a way that reflects her wants and values as she would reflect on an
reaffirm them under noninterfering conditions.
68
Second, she argues that:
[Autonomous choices and behaviour] must reflect, or mirror the wants, desires,
cares concerns values, and commitments that someone reaffirms when attending to
them. To mirror someone's concerns is to accord with them and, especially, to
promote them. Choices and actions mirror wants and values by, for example,
aiming at the attainment of what is wanted or valued, promoting its well-being, or
protecting it from harm.
69
She explains further that to be autonomous, actions and choices they must stem
from what an agent cares deeply about. Such deep wants and desires need to be
"abiding" and "constitute the overarching rationales that an agent regards as justifying
many of her more specific choices., 70 This rich conception of autonomy would not
protect the sudden desires of a person losing capacity, which contradict the values the
65. JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 80-81 (1977).
66. In re T (Refusal of Treatment), [1993] Fam. 95 (Eng.); see also Winick, supra note 17.
67. J. Savulescu & R.W. Momeyer, Should Informed Consent Be Based on Rational
Beliefs?, 23 J. MED. ETHics 282 (2000).
68. MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLmcs 5-6 (2003).
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
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person held dear during his or her life.7 1 Where the decision is impulsive or irrational
in light of a person's long term goals, the decision ceases to deserve the same respect
as those motivated by the values that underpin the person's life. This view takes the
approach that not all decisions made by a competent individual are entitled to equal
respect under the principle of autonomy. Those decisions that are fully-reasoned and
based on the individual's deeply held values are entitled to the most respect, whereas
those that are, for example, based on fleeting desires or impulses are entitled to less.
So, applying these principles to Albert, we must ask whether his recent sexual
escapades are in fact the result of a reasoned decision to reject his previous value
system, or whether they are fleeting, ill-considered decisions that are entitled to only
limited respect under the principle of autonomy. If they are the latter, then there is a
case for saying that his family or caretakers are entitled to take some steps to prevent
that behavior. 72
C. Conclusion on the Just Competent
It has been argued that respect for autonomy does not automatically require us to
allow people who are just competent to act in a way that will cause them serious harm,
or that contradicts values they held dear during their life. First, it has been argued that
where a decision will cause the individual serious harm, this will itself interfere with
their ability to subsequently exercise autonomy, and so, unless we are sure that the
decision is a richly autonomous one, it need not be respected. Second, where the
decision is one that contradicts values that underlie the individual's life, it may also be
regarded as not autonomous, or only weakly protected under the principle of
autonomy, unless it can be shown that the individual has made a conscious decision to
depart from the values that previously underpinned their life.
H1. INCOMPETENT DECISIONS: Do THEY DESERVE ANY RESPECT?
As discussed previously, once a person is found incompetent, then decisions may be
made on that person's behalf based on what is in his or her best interests. A patient's
current views can be taken into account, but only insofar as they might reveal what is
in the patient's best interests. The current views do not appear to carry any weight in
and of themselves. This is because these decisions are not protected by the principle of
autonomy. Current decisions cannot be assumed to be an assessment of what patients
want for their lives, because they lack the ability to make assessments of that kind. In
particular, dementia may cause loss of memory, instability of desires, and an absence
of connection between desires and personality that render decisions not worthy of
respect under the principle of autonomy.73 It is this view that I wish to challenge. But
first, I will explain more about how the law, under the standard approaches, takes
account of the wishes of an incompetent person.
71. Beate R6ssler, Problems with Autonomy, 17 HYPATIA 143 (2002).
72. Precisely what the limits would be lie outside the scope of this article.
73. See Soren Holm, Autonomy, Authenticity, or Best Interest, 4 MED. HEALTH CARE &
PHIL. 153, 154-55 (2001).
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Anglo-American lawyers are familiar with the dispute between those who support a
best interests test and those who support a substituted judgment test.74 Under the "best
interests" approach, 75 the decision-maker decides what is in the best interests of the
person lacking capacity. Under the substituted judgment approach,76 decisions are
made based on an assessment of what the person would have decided if they had had
capacity. 77 These two approaches are commonly presented as competing approaches
and fierce debate has surrounded which is preferable, especially in the context of end
of life decision-making.
78
In fact, the two approaches are more similar than might at first appear. 79 In the
Mental Capacity Act of 2005, English law firmly nailed its colours to the "best
interest" mast. However, the Act explains that in determining a person's best interests
consideration should be taken of "the person's past and present wishes and feelings"
and "the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had
capacity". 80 So, the decision that the person would have taken can carry some weight
in determining what is in his or her interests. 8' Under the substituted judgment
approach, a decision-maker would ask themselves what decision the individual would
make if the individual had capacity. 82 Of course, under the substituted judgment
approach, best interests may play an important role. Decision-making should require
some convincing that a person, if competent, would choose to do something that would
harm them. As this shows the differences between a best interests and substituted
judgment approach are less than may initially be supposed. Indeed, quite a number of
commentators have recommended a mid-way position between the two approaches.
83
The purpose of this article is not to consider whether or not the best interests
approach is preferable to the substituted judgment approach.84 The question I want to
74. Ben A. Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respectfor Patient Autonomy: The More Things
Change the More They Remain the Same, 10 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 87 (2006).
75. In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467,481-83 (N.J. 1981); see also In re K.I.,735 A.2d 448,450
(D.C. 1999); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Wis. 1992).
76. In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716,722-23 (Ga. 1984); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 341 (Minn. 1984); In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1372 (Wash.
1984).
77. Most courts restrict the application of substitute judgment to cases where the individual
was once competent and, therefore, evidence can be found as to the person's subjective
preferences. See In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 455 (D.C. 1999).
78. Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmakingfor Incompetents, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 386 (1981); Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent
Patients, 46 RUTGERs L. REV. 609 (1994).
79. CANTOR, supra note 20, at 105; Eric C. Miller, Listening To The Disabled: End-Of-Life
Medical Decision Making And The Never Competent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2889 (2006).
80. Mental Capacity Act 2005, c. 9, s. 4(6) (Eng.).
81. For a recent English judicial acknowledgement that a best interests test will not
necessarily match the patients wishes see R (Burke) v. Gen. Med. Council, [2005] EWCA 1003,
30 (Eng.).
82. John A. Robertson, Organ Donation by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1976).
83. S. Halliday & L. Witteck, Decision-Making at the End-of-Life and the Incompetent
Patient: A Comparative Approach, 22 MED. & L. 533 (2003).
84. Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a
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focus on is, under either of these approaches, what weight is to be attached to the
current wishes of the patient.
A. Substituted Judgment and the Wishes of the Incompetent Person
As already explained, in a substituted judgment the decision maker is attempting to
make the decision which the incompetent person would have made had they not lost
capacity. Clearly the views and opinion of the person while competent are an essential
element of making any substituted judgment. Less obvious is whether their current
incompetent views are relevant.
It appears that there have been some cases where the court, using the substituted
judgment doctrine, has focused on the subjective wishes of the incompetent person. In
In re Hier,85 Mary Hier, aged 92, suffered a mental illness. She had an obstructed
esophagus and a surgically implanted abdominal feeding tube. She repeatedly pulled
out the feeding tube. The court said that the substitute judgment doctrine "focuses
attention on, and requires giving weight to, the subjective wishes of the incompetent
patient."8 6 In In re Guardianship oflngram, 87 the Washington Supreme Court said that
the wishes of an incompetent person should be given weight as "a strong indicator of
what treatment she would choose if competent to do so." With respect, the strength of
that claim may depend on the cause and impact of the mental impairment. If the
person's personality has changed beyond recognition or where their wishes are the
result of delusion it seems hard to accept that their current views indicate what a
person would have chosen if competent. What may be said is that unless there is
evidence to suggest otherwise an incompetent person's current views can be taken to
represent what the person would have decided if competent.
B. Best Interests and Incompetent People's Views
"Best interests" are often characterized as the objective assessment of the patient's
welfare. Therefore, the current wishes of the incompetent individual carry no weight.
However, they can be relevant as evidence. They are useful in ascertaining the present
emotional and physical status of the patient. 88 There is the very practical point that
giving a patient treatment that he or she opposes may well not be clinically effective.
Many treatments require the co-operation of the patient, if they are to be effective.
89
There may be difficulties in administering treatment which the person is opposing. The
physical and emotional harm to the patient and those administering the treatment may
counterbalance its benefits.
Constructive Preference Standardfor Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance
Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1193 (1996).
85. 464 N.E.2d 959, 960 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
86. Id., at 965. But see George J. Annas, Law and the Life of Sciences: The Case of Mary
Hier: When Substituted Judgment Becomes Sleight of Hand 14 HASTiNGS CENTRE REP 23
(1984).
87. 689 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Wash. 1984).
88. CANTOR, supra note 20, at 204.
89. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432
(Mass. 1977). Cf In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981) (citing physical resistance as
evidence of incapacity).
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C. Giving Weight to the View of the Incompetent Person
I have argued that under either a substituted judgment approach or a best interest
approach, the current views of the patient will count for little apart from as evidence of
what the patient is feeling or whether the patient is likely to co-operate in treatment. I
now want to argue that there are good reasons for respecting the decisions of a person
lacking capacity in their own right. Their value lies not just in providing us with
information upon which an assessment of best interests can be made.
The most common reason given for respecting a competent patient's decision over
medical treatment is the right of autonomy. As I have pointed out, when a person loses
capacity the right of autonomy no longer applies. However, I will argue now that
autonomy is not the only reason why a patient's views deserve respect. While the
autonomy arguments may no longer apply when capacity is lost, the other reasons
remain. Reasons to respect patient decisions regardless of capacity include: the right to
dignity; the right to liberty; the patient-doctor relationship; and the idea of pluralism.
1. Right to Dignity
Much academic attention has been paid to the notion of dignity. 9° There is no
getting away from the fact that the concept is unclear and that it means a variety of
things to different people. 9' To some, dignity and autonomy are intertwined.
Respecting a person's dignity means respecting their competent decisions. Not
respecting a person's choices means showing disrespect to their dignity. 92 Others,
however, see dignity having a broader meaning than simply respecting autonomy.
93
Indeed the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in its first article
opens with the statement: "All human beings are born free, equal in dignity and human
rights."
Forcing treatment on an objecting person (even if they lack capacity) contravenes
their dignity. 94 Norman Cantor has argued however, that "It would be dehumanizing to
ignore the will and feelings of a profoundly disabled person and to simply impose a
surrogate's will. This would treat the prospective patient as if he or she were an
inanimate object., 95
90. FIONA RANDALL& R.S. DOWNIE, THE PHILOSOPHY OFPALLIATIVE CARE: CRITIQUE AND
RECONSTRUCTION (2006); Matti Hayry Another Look at Dignity, 13 CAMBRIDGEQ. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 7 (2004); Lennart Nordenfelt, Dignity and the care of the elderly, 6 MED., HEALTH CARE
& PHIL. 103 (2003).
91. Roger Brownsword, Human rights - What hope? Human dignity - What scope?, in
ETHICS, LAW AND SOCIETY 189 (Jennifer Gunning & Soren Holm, eds. 2005).
92. E.g., I. Randers & A-C Mattiasson, Autonomy and Integrity: Upholding Older Adult
Patients' Dignity, 45 J. ADVANCED NuRsING 63 (2003).
93. See generally Jose Miola, The Need for Informed Consent: Lessons from the Ancient
Greeks, 15 CAMBRIDGEQ. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 152 (2006); Lennart Nordenfelt, The Varieties
of Dignity 12 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 69 (2004); S. Martyn, Substitute Judgment, Best Interests
and the Need for Best Respect, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 3 (1994).
94. S. Pleschberge, Dignity and the Challenge of Dying in Nursing Homes: The Residents'
View, 36 AGE & AGEING 197 (2007).
95. CANTOR, supra note 20, at 206; see also Elysa R. Koppelman, Dementia and Dignity:
Towards a New Method of Surrogate Decision Making, 27 J. MED. & PHIL. 65 (2002).
[Vol. 83:16191634
ENTERING THE FOG
To count the wishes and desires of an incompetent person as no more than the
grunts of an animal, is show a lack of respect. 96 This viewpoint fails to show
appropriate reverence of the person. However confused and muddled and misled, the
individual's views are those of a person and dignity requires that they be respected as
such.97 This is reflected in the common practice among health care professionals of
obtaining the assent of a person to treatment, even if they clearly lack capacity to make
a decision. 98 This represents an acknowledgement that the individual, whatever their
mental capabilities, deserved to be treated as a fellow human being.
2. Right to Liberty
It is argued that liberty is a basic good. Isaiah Berlin captured this in a famous
passage:
I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of
will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from
outside. I wish to be ... a doer--deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and
not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an
animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals
and policies of my own and realising them.... I wish, above all, to be conscious
of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my
choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and purposes.99
The freedom of bodily integrity and movement should be protected even if the
individual's capacity to understand this is restricted. 100 Where, therefore, the person is
unwilling to undergo the treatment the person's rights of bodily integrity and freedom
of movement deserve protection.
3. Patient-doctor relationships
Requiring medical professionals to respect the wishes of an incompetent person will
promote good patient-doctor relationships. It will encourage truth telling, openness,
and trust which are more likely to be fostered by listening to and attaching weight to
the wishes of a patient, even where the patient is incompetent. Linked to this argument
is the fact that a hospital is meant to be a place of cure and recovery. The sight or
96. Lennart Nordenfelt, Dignity and the Care of the Elderly 6 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL.
130 (2003); Lennart Nordenfelt, Dignity of the Elderly, 6 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 99
(2003).
97. See the discussion in L. Orulv and N. Nikku, Dignity Work in Dementia Care:
Sketching a Microethical Analysis, 6 DEMENrIA 507 (2007).
98. V. Molinari, L.B. McCullough, J.H. Coverdale, and R. Workman, Principles and
Practice of Geriatric Assent, 10 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 48 (2006).
99. IsAiAH BERLIN, Two Concepts ofLiberty, in FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131 (1969).
100. It is protected under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, U.N.
Convention of Human Rights, Article 9, and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (right to liberty).
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sound of a patients being forced to receive treatment against their will is likely to be
traumatic for staff and patients.
4. Pluralism
Medical lawyers can be tempted to assume that "best interests" or beneficence is a
straight-forward issue---of course it is not. There are many medical scenarios in which
a reasonable case can be given for alternatives. Many day-to-day issues involving the
care of the demented are not medical and can involve religious, social, and cultural
issues. While we may be (or may be not) confident that a doctor or other medical
professional can assess what is medically in a patient's best interests, we may not want
them deciding social and religious issues. Deferring to the patient avoids this, to the
relief of many medical professionals, no doubt. Indeed one of the benefits of autonomy
is that it means professionals and courts are not drawn into making controversial
decisions about which they may feel uncomfortable and where they might lose the
public's respect. There is, therefore, a good case for respecting the decision of the
incompetent person especially where there no serious harm will result and the issue is
one of moral controversy.
D. Conclusion
As these points demonstrate, even though a person is judged to lack capacity and
the right of autonomy no longer protects the person's views, this does not mean the
views count for nothing. There are several other legal principles and values which can
be used to give weight to their views. These principles, set out above, are reflected in
the practice of "person-centred care."' 0' Its keys principles are valuing people with
dementia and those who care for them; treating people as individuals; looking at the
world from the perspective of the person with dementia and creating a positive social
environment. Theses things are, of course, easier to say than to put into practice.
Valuing someone as a person requires an acknowledgement that the person still is a
sentient person and a person worthy of respect and being listened to.1
0 2
The argument made is only a modest one that the views of the incompetent person
do carry some weight on their own. The argument is not that incompetent patient's
wishes should be followed regardless of the consequences. Rather the wishes of the
incompetent person should be followed unless there is a good reason for not doing
so. 1
0 3
101. Dawn Brooker, What is Person-centred Care in Dementia?, 13 REvIEws IN CLINICAL
GERONTOLOGY 215 (2004).
102. Koppelman, supra note 95, at 65.
103. Eric C. Miller, Note, Listening to the Disabled: End-of-Life Medical Decision Making
and the Never Competent, 74 FORDHAM L. Rv. 2889, at 2920 (2006).
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Ill. ADVANCE DmEcTIvEs
A. Introduction
If it is accepted that some weight should be attached to the wishes of incompetent
people then this leaves the issue of how these are to be taken account of in a case
where there is an advance directive. There has been much dispute between those who
emphasise the importance the interests of the demented person as they are now and
those who seek to elevate the importance of the views of the person they once were.
Ronald Dworkin sets out the two views:
We may think of that person, as the putative holder of rights, in two different
ways: as a demented person, in which case we emphasize his present situation and
capacities, or as a person who has become demented, in which case we emphasize
that his dementia has occurred in the course of a larger life whose whole length
must be considered in any decision about what rights he has.' 04
Of course in many cases there is no difficulty. The proposed treatment or course of
action is in the best interests of the patient, they appear content with it, and there is
nothing in an advance directive or from their earlier life which would suggest any other
course of action. But it is where there is a clash between a patient's current wishes or
current best interests and their views expressed in an effective advance directive that
the problems arise.' 05 Before entering that debate something needs to be said about the
use of advance directives in practice.
B. Practical points on advance directives
Most people do not execute advance directives. 106 Even though patients are
generally positive about them in theory, they appear reluctant to actually use them in
practice. ' 0 7 There may be many reasons for this. The most prominent, no doubt, is
inertia. But research has also indicated a range of other reasons. One noticeable one is
a concern that medical professionals will "misuse" directives. In particular that they
will be interpreted widely to justify withdrawing or withholding treatment when the
patient might have wanted the treatment to continue. 10 8 Another issue was the
difficulty people had in deciding how they would want to be treated in the event of a
serious medical illness."09 Even where an advance directive is written, one study found
104. Dworkin, supra note 61, at 4.
105. Michael J. Newton, Precedent Autonomy: Life-Sustaining Intervention and the
Demented Patient, 8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 189 (1999).
106. Christopher B. Rosnick & Sandra L. Reynolds, Thinking Ahead: Factors Associated
with Executing Advance Directives, 15 J. AGING & HEALTH 409.(2003).
107. Robert E. Enck, Advance Directives: Burden or Benefit?, 20 AM. J. HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE 329 (2003)
108. S. Sahm, R. Will & G. Hommel, Attitudes Towards and Barriers to Writing Advance
Directives Amongst Cancer Patients, Healthy Controls, and Medical Staff, 31 J. MED. ETHICS
437, 440 (2005).
109. Martin Eisemann & J6rg Richter, Relationships Between Various Attitudes Towards
Self-Determination in Health Care with Special Reference to an Advance Directive, 25 J. MED.
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that only thirty-nine percent of the sample wanted their advance directives to be
interpreted "strictly." A striking forty-two percent wanted physicians to have a lot or
complete leeway to depart from the directive if they felt it was inappropriate.l"
0
C. Dworkin's approach
To many people, keeping control of their lives is extremely important. Few of us
like to be told what to do. The fear of losing control and having others take decisions
for us is nightmarish. Hence the attraction of advance directives. They will appeal
particularly to those who are concerned that surrogate decision-makers will fail to
safeguard the values they hold dear. 1 Advance directives enable us to make plans for
the future and make arrangements about how we will be remembered and live out the
end of our lives." 2 One academic has reproduced her own advance directive, which
reveals the concerns of many people. It reads:
When I suffer from Alzheimer's disease and I do not recognize my children
anymore, and I have to reside in a nursing home permanently, I refuse lifesaving
or prolonging treatment. I would hope for euthanasia. I realize there may be a time
that I myself am past caring and not unhappy. But I do not want my children to
witness and to suffer from my steady decline into nothingness. I see no point at all
in continuing my life when I have lost the dignity, the purposes and the emotional
commitments that I consider essential to the story of my life and my person." 
3
Ronald Dworkin has written one of the persuasive cases in favour of placing weight
on advance directives. 114 Only a brief outline of his views can be presented here. To
him the right of autonomy is central to our humanity. It "encourages and protects
people's general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own
character, a sense of what is important to and for them."" 5 At the heart of his thinking
about advance directives is the distinction between critical and experiential interests. "
6
He sees experiential interests as concerning the quality of enjoyment or pleasure. They
might include pursuing activities such as watching television or drinking tea. Critical
interests are all about doing or having in our lives the things that we consider good or
valuable. Often critical interests are pursued despite the fact they do not provide
enjoyment or pleasure. Sacrifices are made for family; projects are pursued even when
they have lost some of the "first love." Critical interests will involve matters which go
to the core of the person such as religious beliefs and important life projects.
ETHics 37 (1999); Thomas A. Mappes, Persistent Vegetative State, Prospective Thinking, and
Advance Directives, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHics J. 119 (2003).
110. Leslie P. Francis, supra note 9, at 572 (2001)
111. Alasdair R. Maclean, Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-making, 14 MED.
L. REv. 291 (2006).
112. Francis, supra note 9, at 572.
113. Inez de Beaufort, The View from Before, 7 AMER. J. BioETHicS 57 (2007).
114. See also Michael Quant, Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity, 9 KENNEDY INST.
ETHics J. 365 (1999).
115. RONALD DWORKIN, LiFE's DOMINION 224(1993).
116. For a critical look at Dworkin's writings on this, see John Finnis, Euthanasia, Morality,
and Law, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1123 (1998).
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Dworkin argues that it is our critical interests that are most important to our
autonomy. These are the things that are at the heart of our plans for our lives. For
Dworkin, a person's critical beliefs survive incapacity. A person having lost capacity
should be treated in a way which would be consistent with their critical interests, or at
least not inconsistent with them. Dworkin can accept that some people without
capacity may have experiential interests. They may be able to experience pleasure in
certain activities, but respect for these experiential interests should never be at the
expense of the patient's critical interests articulated during their competent life. The
incompetent person's current wishes should be ignored "because he lacks the
necessary capacity for a fresh exercise of autonomy. His former decision remains in
force because no new decision by a person capable of autonomy has annulled it."" 7
Jeff McMahan even suggests that the competent person is retrospectively harmed if an
advance directive is not followed. He argues that the competent part of a person's life
should be seen as dominant over the demented part which should be "sacrificed for the
greater good of her earlier self." 1
8
Dworkin does not shy away from the implications of his approach. He refers to the
much discussed case of Margo. 119 Much discussed not because her scenario is unusual,
but because it is so typical. She is described as a 54-year-old-woman, suffering from
dementia, but extraordinarily happy. Each day is the same. She rereads pages of a book
she never finishes, eats the same food (peanut butter and jelly), and paints the same
picture. Dworkin argues she has experiential interests: she is able to gain great pleasure
from her activities. But no critical interests (in respect of her current state). She has lost
the ability to develop the life goals central to one's critical interests. Dworkin asks us
to imagine that when previously competent she had written an advance directive
refusing life saving treatment, if she were ever to suffer dementia. She now has a chest
infection and needs antibiotic treatment to cure her. Should it be provided? The
scenario is well chosen because of course she is happy in her current state. Dworkin
argues that her critical interests as expressed in her advance directive should trump any
experiential interests. In short, she should be allowed to die.
D. Criticisms of Dworkin
Critics of Dworkin have attacked his argument from a number of perspectives. First,
and perhaps most prominently, has been the argument that he assumes that the
competent person has the right to speak for and about the incompetent person. The
objection to this centres on the nature of personhood.120 As is well known, Derek
Parfit, building on the work of John Locke,' 21 has argued that central to personhood is
consciousness and psychological awareness. Where a person loses capacity this can
117. DwORKIN, supra note 115, at 227.
118. JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHics OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 502-03
(2002).
119. Andrew D. Firlik, Margo 's Logo, 9 J. AMER. MED. ASS'N 201 (1991).
120. David Degrazia, Advance Directives, Dementia and 'the Someone Else Problem', 13
BioETHics 373 (1999); Julian C. Hughes, Views of the Person with Dementia, 27 J. OF MED.
ETHics 86 (2001).
121. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1961); DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 205-07 (1984).
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cause a loss of psychological continuity. Where the person has no recollection of who
they were and loses connections with the values which governed their life then they
have, in effect, become a different person. The psychological continuity of the
previous person has ceased and a new person(s) has been created. Therefore, when
making decisions about the person who has lost capacity the views of the person with
capacity are not the same person's views. They are no more relevant than the views of
any other person.'
22
This response to Dworkin, unsurprisingly, has, in turn, its critics. 23 It appears to
place a lot of weight on a Cartesean dualist split between the mind and the body. It
does not recognise the part bodies play in identity. 124 Even if there is a psychological
discontinuity, there is a physical continuity. The current person is still part of the
narrative of the life of the earlier person. 125 Even more significantly, these critics of
Dworkin overlook the fact that to those who know them, the incompetent person is
connected to and represents the competent person. No one, for example, believes that if
their parent develops dementia the person somehow ceases to be their mother or father.
When the individual is seen within a relational context they are to their family and
community the same person they have always been. 126 There is an additional difficulty
for lawyers in accepting Parfit's arguments in this context. That is that it does not fit
with all kinds of legal doctrines.'1 27 We hardly treat a change in personality as a death
of a legal identity. 128 A person facing a criminal charge has no defence based on the
fact that the person who committed the crime is psychologically disconnected from
them.
A second set of criticisms of Dworkin's views question the weight he places on
experiential interests. It may be questioned whether it is possible to divide up a
person's interests into critical and experiential ones. At what point does a person's
enjoyment of a hobby become a critical interest? Further, it may be claimed that it
presents an idealized view of how people, in fact, live out their lives. Do people really
sit down and plan a great vision for their lives ruled by higher order preferences or do
they live each day as it comes or at least a life marked by contradiction and chaos,
rather than a grand plan? 129 Rebecca Dresser suggests: "[M]any people take life one
day at a time. The goal of establishing a coherent narrative may be a less common life
122. An extreme view is that a person with severe dementia ceases to be a person at all. See
the discussion in Allen Buchanan, Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem, 17
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 277, 280 (1988).
123. ERIC T. OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY
(1997); MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES (1996).
124. Maclean, supra note 111, at 291.
125. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
(1989).
126. See generally Ben A. Rich, Prospective Autonomy and Critical Interests: A Narrative
Defense of the Moral Authority ofAdvance Directives, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q HEALTHCARE ETHICS
138 (1997); Hughes, supra note 120, at 86; Tom Kitwood, The Experience of Dementia, 3
AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 179 (1997).
127. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity. 68 N.C. L. REv. 845, 852 (1990).
128. Rich, supra note 126, at 146.
129. FRIEDMAN, supra note 68, at 39.
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theme than the simple effort to accept and adjust to the changing natural and social
circumstances that characterize a person's life."'
130
These criticisms of Dworkin's approach carry some weight. However, the difficulty
in applying the distinction he seeks to draw does not necessarily mean it is of no use.
Many of the fundamental distinctions drawn by lawyers are difficult in application, but
that does not mean they are not good ones to make.
A third set of criticisms highlights the difficulties in determining whether when the
person made the advance directive they had sufficient information to make an informed
decision about how they should be treated if they were to lose capacity. For example,
they will not know what medical treatment may be available in the future for
conditions they fear or even know precisely what it is like to suffer the condition they
fear. 131 There is much evidence that although people are terrified of certain conditions,
when in fact they suffer them they are far happier than they thought they would be.' 
3 2
At most, these arguments seem to suggest that there may be circumstances in which an
advance directive is flawed by a lack of knowledge some subsequent unforeseen
development. Hence, some critics do not argue against the use of advance directives
where a fully informed decision is made about a particular condition which then
materialises in exactly the circumstances the person expected when he or she had
capacity.
There is, it is argued, a more powerful objection to Dworkin's approach and that is
the lack of weight attached to the views and welfare of the current incapacitated
person. Placing all the weight on critical interests means that in the words of one
learned commentator the current individual is a person "to treat, control, restrain, or
perhaps simply tolerate.... To take this sort of attitude towards someone is to see him
as no longer fully human." 133 It is suggested that Dworkin's views have gained much
support because they have been used in the context of life or death issues. But outside
that arena, the problems are immediately apparent. If a patient of devout religious
belief is concerned that if they lose capacity they will no longer continue their religious
devotions and therefore create an advance directive that religious services are
performed in their presence weekly. Such a directive may indeed reflect a critical
interest, but should it be followed even if the great anguish the incompetent person is
feeling when the services take place? Should strict dietary requests expressed in an
advance directive be followed if it is causing the individual serious pain? It is hard to
justify the pain to the current person caused in the name of values to the previous
person of which they have no recollection. While competent we are willing to accept
suffering in the name of pursuing our critical interests and the succor from knowing we
are reaching for a higher goal may make those suffering more bearable. But for the
incompetent there is no compensation in relation to the crucial interests for the pain.
130. Ronald Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, in
BIOETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 312, 316-17 (Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer eds., 1999).
131. Callahan, supra note 58, at 26.
132. DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2005). I am grateful to Dean Lauren Robel
for introducing me to this book.
133. Michelle Moody-Adams, On the Old Saw that Character Is Destiny, in IDENTrrY,
CHARACTER, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 111, 124-25 (Owen Flanagan &
Amelie 0. Rorty eds., 1990).
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E. Dresser's approach
To some commentators, the guiding principle for all those who have lost capacity is
that that we should promote their best interests. This should be done even if it means
going against any advance directive. Our basic duty is to protect those who have lost
capacity. 134 Rebecca Dresser has been most prominent in promoting this approach. 135
She rejects an argument that the views of the competent person as expressed in an
advance directive should dominate because she sees the demented person is so vastly
altered from the previous person.' 36 "Courts have a hard time understanding the
subjectivity of the incompetent patient. They sometimes speak as if a patient were still
the competent person she once was; they sometimes construct a mythical, generalized
competent person to inhabit the body that lies before them."' 
37
Instead of focusing on what they would have wanted when competent she proposes
a different approach:
We should seek a more reciprocal relationship with these patients. Rather than
making them the mirror of our own fears about debilitation and the end of life, we
should attempt to ascertain their point of view, their perspective, on what is to be
decided. If they have none, if their consciousness of self and others is lost, then we
can safely resolve the cases on other grounds. If they do have a perspective, a set
of interests, then this should be the focus of treatment decision-making. 1
38
John Robertson takes a similar line arguing:
The values and interests of the competent person no longer are relevant to
someone who has lost the rational structure on which those values and interests
rested. Unless we are to view competently held values and interests as extending
even into situations in which, because of incompetency, they can no longer have
meaning, it matters not that as a competent person the individual would not wish
to be maintained in a debilitated or disabled state. If the person is no longer
competent enough to appreciate the degree of divergence from her previous
activity that produced the choice against treatment, the prior directive does not
represent her current interests merely because a competent directive was issued. 139
Dresser points out throughout our life we change our views and perspectives on the
world. Things we dread turn out to be surprisingly enjoyable; people we thought we
would not like become friends. Fortunately we are not tied to our initial experiences
134. Rebecca Dresser, Schiavo 's Legacy: The Needforan Objective Standard, 35 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 20 (2005).
135. Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 609 (1994).
136. Id. at 611.
137. On the difficulties of imagining what it would be like to be different see DANIEL C.
DENNETT, CONSciousNEss EXPLAINED 441-42 (1991); THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEw FROM
NOWHERE 13-27 (1986).
138. Dresser, supra note 135, at 613.
139. John A. Robertson, Second Thoughts on Living Wills, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 7
(1991).
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and views. In other words, although the person may once have had certain critical
interests when he or she wrote the advance directive, there is no reason to assume the
current person still has them. 140 It is, therefore, inappropriate to attach weight to the
views of the person before they were in an incapacitated state. Professor Jaworska puts
the point this way:
[T]he moral pull of Dresser's position is undeniable: the caregiver ... is faced
with a person-or if not a fully constituted person, at least a conscious being
capable of pleasure and pain-who, here and now, makes a claim on the caregiver
to fulfil her needs and desires; why ignore these needs and desires in the name of
values that are now extinct? 141
Considering the case of Margo, Dresser argues that following Dworkin's approach
and letting her die from an infection will mean that: "Happy and contented Margo will
experience clear harm from the decision that purports to advance the critical interests
she no longer cares about." 1
42
F. Problems with the Dresser approach
Critics of Dresser's position often criticise her argument that the two people are no
longer the same. We have already discussed the arguments over "two person"
argument. There is, in fact, no need to adopt that theory to support Dresser's approach.
One could readily accept that the two people are indeed the same, but argue that the
claims of the now incompetent person to have their welfare promoted trump the views
of the competent person expressed in the advance directive. 143
A second problem posed by Dresser's argument is exemplified by Dena Davis's
article which accepts Dresser's argument. She entitles her article "Help! My Body is
being invaded by an alien."'44 She expresses concern that if she develops Alzheimer's
a new form of person will take over her body. To avoid this suicide when the first
stages of Alzheimer's appear is discussed as a sensible option. This is hardly the kind
of thinking Dresser would advocate, but it lends itself to it. Dresser's approach offers
no hope to those who are terrified of what will happen to them if they lose capacity and
want to exercise some control over it. Nor does it readily explain why in fact most
caregivers do instinctively try and treat the incompetent person in line with the values
by which they lived their life. In a recent English decision,14 5 a dispute arose over
treatment of a Muslim woman who had lost capacity. It concerned whether or not she
should receive care in line with Muslim tradition, or whether, as was argued on the
other side, as she did not know what was happening to her she should not receive
140. Holm, supra note 73, at 156-58.
141. Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins ofAgency: Alzheimer's Patients and the
Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 108 (1999).
142. Dresser, supra note 130, at 36.
143. Buchanan, supra note 122, at 280-83.
144. Dena Davis, Help! My Body is Being Invaded by an Alien!, 7 AMER. J. BIoETIcs 60
(2007).
145. Ahsan v. University Hospitals Leicester NHS Trust, (2006) EWHC 2624 (Q.B.).
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special treatment. The judge thought it was beyond doubt that she should be treated in
accordance with her religion.
G. Compromise views
The debate between these two views has raged for some time and no consensus has
emerged. Several commentators have sought to develop compromise views, and this
seems the sensible way ahead. 146 On the "one person or two" debate the correct
answer seems to be that there are senses in which the person is the same as the one
they were-both in a bodily sense but also within the context of their relationships
with others. There is another sense where there has been such a psychological break
and such a difference in what is important about a person has been lost and it makes
sense to talk of being only the most tenuous link between the past and present person.
So the solution there appears to lie in an acceptance of the view that the incompetent
person is in some sense the same person as the competent person and in others a
different person.
On the central policy to adopt, it seems that both camps are too extreme. Dresser's
refusal to pay any weight on advance directive appears too strong. Where the advance
directive applies in relation to an issue which will not seriously harm the patient, it
seems a good argument can be made for respecting it. The desire people have to
exercise control over what happens to them when they are not longer able to control
their destiny appears to be a strong one, as the use of wills demonstrates. I can see no
reason why if a patient has requested in an advance directive that they be fed
vegetarian food if they lose capacity that this should not be respected unless there are
strong countervailing reasons. Allowing this will provide comfort to people when
facing the prospect of incapacity. Indeed, Penney Lewis suggests a failure to allow
people to exercise some control over what happens to them when they lose capacity
could infringe their human rights. 147 On the other hand, I see no reason for following
Dworkin's view and attaching all weight to an advance directive, regardless of the pain
it will cause the individual. I refer back to my example of the person asking for a
religious service to be preformed regularly in their presence but which are now causing
them anguish. While some weight can be placed on the directive, this should not be at
the expense of harm to the current individual.
The correct approach it is suggested is somewhere in between Dworkin and
Dresser. One suggestion comes from Alasdair Maclean.1 48 Maclean recommends
following a clear advance directives unless the result would cause significant harm,
pain, or terror to the patient. In the case of less clear directives, a balancing exercise
would be required between the views expressed in the directive and the experiential
interests of the person lacking capacity. Leslie Francis taking a similar approach
accepts that such guidelines will lead to debates over when the harm will be sufficient
to mean that the directive will not followed,"[b]ut they seem to capture what is morally
146. Elizabeth B. Gedge, Collective Moral Imagination: Making Decisions for Persons with
Dementia, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 435 (2004).
147. Penney Lewis, Medical Treatment of Dementia Patients at the End of Life: Can the
Law Accommodate the Personal Identity and Welfare Problems?, 13 EuR. J. HEALTH L. 219
(2006).
148. Maclean, supra note 11, at 291.
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important about precedent autonomy-guidance for how one's life winds down; as well
as what is morally important about experiential interests: avoiding pain and continuing
experiences of relative quality to the extent that clear prior autonomy is not
compromised." 1
49
My view would be similar to that but with greater respect for following the views of
the incompetent person. Maclean, as so many others writing in this area, have focused
on autonomy to the exclusion of dignity and liberty. I would follow the current wishes
of the individual unless those would cause the patient serious harm. Where the current
individual does not have strong views, then an advance directive can be used to
determine how the patient is treated.
IV. SOME BROADER OBSERVATIONS
In the light of the discussion above, I now want to take a broader look at the issues
surrounding dementia and loss of capacity.
According to the American Alzheimer's Association there are 4.5 million American
suffering from Alzheimer's disease:' 50 nearly 50% of people over the age of 85 will
develop the condition.' 5' This means that the "them" and "us" image that can pervade
the discussion of dementia is unconvincing. Alzheimer's is becoming the norm for
ageing, rather than a disease affecting the few. Indeed, even the notion of Alzheimer's
as a disease is open to question. In Japan, for example, there is a widespread cultural
belief that Alzheimer's is no more than the normal process of ageing. 152 Where the
symptoms are publicly manifest that indicates a lack of adequate care by the family,
rather than an illness of the individual. I would certainly not go so far as to deny the
existence of the medical condition, but those who are more cynical about it have valid
points.
First, there is an issue over the extent to which manifestations of the dementia are a
result of the disease and to what extent they are a response to the social situation
sufferers find themselves in, especially given low level of care demented patients often
receive. 153 Second, there is no getting away from the fact that prior to the discovery of
Alzheimer's Disease there was no separation between those with Alzheimer's and
others ageing in a "normal" way. There is a case for acknowledging that with old age
comes brain ageing which affects us all in different ways. The social narrative of
Alzheimer's as a horrific terrifying disease, which is widely feared, has meant that the
truth, that brain deterioration is extremely common in old age and is a natural part of
ageing, has been lost. 154 We need to find a way of valuing and treasuring the natural
progression of old age, just as we value the earliest stages of life. The ageing of brain
149. Francis, supra note 9, at 592.
150. ALZHEIMER'S Ass'N, BASICS OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT YOU CAN
Do 8 (2007), available at http://www.alz.org/national/documentsbrochure-basicsofalzilow.pdf
151. Id.
152. Peter Whitehouse, The End of Alzheimer Disease?, 15 ALZHEIMER DISEASE &
ASSOCIATED DISORDERS 59 (2001).
153. JOANNE LYNN, SICK TO DEATH AND NOT GOING TO TAKE IT ANYMORE!: REFORMING
HEALTH CARE FOR THE LAST YEARS OF LIFE (2004).
154. Peter Whitehouse, The Next 100 Years ofAlzheimer 's - Learning to Care, Not Cure, 6
DEMENTIA 459 (2007).
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will affect nearly all of us and needs to be regarded as part of being human, rather than
a humiliating disease.
Another point that emerges from the discussion in this article is that lawyers so
easily over-emphasise the importance of autonomy.155 Just because a person lacks
capacity and is unable to make decisions does not mean that they lack rights or
interests. Even if the view and desires of the incapacitated person are not the result of a
rational decision, respect due to them as people requires us to give them weight. While
rational decisions are worthy of legal respect and attention so too should be our values,
feelings, emotions, and the other aspects of our humanity. The demented may have lost
the full power of rational thought, but that does not mean they have the ability to feel,
care, or value. The emphasis on rational thought is reflected on the way assessments of
capacity are made. These tend to be cognitivistic and rationalistic. 156 Matters such as
emotion, personal identity, narrative are not included as ways decisions can be
reached. 157 The fact a finding of incompetence leads us to attach no weight to the
views of the incompetent in themselves show that we have elevated reasoning over
other ways of interpreting and responding to the world. 158 It is only a failure to value
our non-rational humanity that can lead to an assumption that the incompetent person
has "nothing to tell us." We need much more attention to be given to the lived
experiences of those with dementia and finding ways of appreciating and respecting
their views, emotions, and humanity.'
1 59
A third point that emerges from the discussion is the individualistic nature of the
legal approach. Incompetent people are assessed and treated in isolation and are not
seen as relational people, in mutually inter-dependant relationships. An assessment of
capacity should be of an individual located within their network of family, friends, and
care-givers. 160 Instead, the assessment is made of the individual sitting alone in a
doctor's office. Few of us, in fact, make important decisions on our own and without
consultation and discussion with those around us. At least part of the assessment of
capacity should be the extent to which the person within their support group of family
and/or friends is able to make choices. Further, when decisions need to be made for a
person of doubtful capacity, decisions should be made within the person's relational
context.161 George P. Smith II has argued in this context for "negotiated consent"
rather than informed consent. 162 He explains:
155. Carolyn Sargent and Carolyn Smith-Morris, Questioning our Principles:
Anthropological Contributions to Ethical Dilemmas in Clinical Practice, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF
HEALTHCARE ETHics 123 (2006).
156. Berghmans et al., supra note 33, at 252.
157. Id., at 258.
158. Id.
159. Stephen G. Post, Comments on Research in the Social Sciences Pertaining to
Alzheimer's Disease: A More Humble Approach, 5 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH (Supplement 1)
S17 (2001).
160. Ho Mun Chan, Sharing Death and Dying: Advance Directives, Autonomy and the
Family, 18 BIOETHICs 87 (2004).
161. Sara Horton-Deutsch, Prudence Twigg & Rebecca Evans, Health Care Decision-
making of Persons with Dementia, 6 DEMENTIA 105 (2007).
162. George P. Smith, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 109
(2004).
1646 [Vol. 83:1619
ENTERING THE FOG
Under the negotiated consent standard, many legitimate views must be considered
involving the patient, family, and institution. The results are shared or dispersed
authority for decision-making in which no single party has the exclusive power of
decision and a nonalgorithmic process whereby negotiation is not governed by
strict deductive rules. 1
63
Further, assessment of best interests tends to view patients in isolation. Where a
person lacking capacity is being cared for informally by family and friends or in an
institutional setting, it is simply impossible to make every decision based on what will
promote the best interests of the incapacitated person. In caring relationships, it
becomes impossible to separate out the interests of the carer and the cared for. Indeed,
it is sometimes difficult to determine who is the carer and who is the person being
cared for. 164 That would put an intolerable burden on those caring for them. Inevitably
within a caring relationship there is give and take. Some decisions will benefit one
party more than the other, but other decisions will make up for that. This is how it is in
real life in a well-working caring relationship and this is how it should be. 16
5
A final point is to emphasise our vulnerabilities. Quite rightly there is much
emphasis on the vulnerability and dependence of those lacking capacity. There are
concerns that they may be taken advantage of by others or be unable to care for
themselves. But it is easy to overlook the vulnerability and the dependency of the
competent too. Very few patients consenting to medical treatment or people making
financial decisions are in fact fully informed or acting on the basis of a rational
decision. We often delegate such decisions to others. 166 Taubner has pointed
out:"Frightened and in psychological, if not also physical distress, the patient is
fundamentally dis-eased. To think rationally and dispassionately about life-and-death
choices is all too often beyond normal human ability. Indeed, fear about sickness or
death is the appropriate response when we ourselves are the subject of calamity." 167
Although those comments are made in the context of life and death decisions, they
are true about many important decisions we make. Similarly, dependency should not
be something to be afraid of or ashamed of. Something has gone very wrong with our
care of vulnerable older people when "not being a burden" is reported as the main goal
of their lives by patients living in nursing homes.168 Dependency on others is an aspect
of our humanity. From our earliest beginnings, we are in relationships of dependency
and we are for much if not all in of our lives-sometimes receiving, sometimes giving,
and often doing both. We may look to puff our selves up on our independence and
boast of the rational powers we use to exercise our autonomy. The truth is a little less
grand. Many decisions we take are based on little evidence and made based on
irrational fears and emotions. Relationships of dependency are central to our lives. We
163. Id. at 122.
164. See generally Jonathan Herring, Where Are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?,
27 LEGAL STUD. 51 (2007).
165. I have expanded and justified this approach in Jonathan Herring, The Place of Carers,
in LAW AND BIoETHICs (Michael Freeman ed., 2008).
166. Susan A. Channick, The Myth of Autonomy at the End-of-Life: Questioning the
Paradigm of Rights, 44 VmL. L. REv. 577 (1999).
167. Alfred I. Tauber, PATIENT AUTONOMY AND THE ETHics OF RESPONSIBILrrY 143 (2005).
168. Pleschberge, supra note 94 at 197.
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may point to rationality and independence as marking the line between competence
and incompetence, but, in fact, they demonstrate how blurry that line is.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the position of those on the borderline of incapacity.
This is a borderline of huge legal significance with different legal regimes governing
those on one side of the line and those on the other. I have sought to blur that line. It
has been suggested that where those who are assessed as just competent make
decisions to engage in behaviour which causes them significant harm or is contrary to
values they have followed during their life then those decisions should not be regarded
as necessarily protected by the principle of autonomy. I have also argued that the views
of incompetent people should be given far more respect under the law. Principles of
dignity and liberty require us to let incompetent people decide how they wish to live
unless doing so will cause them significant harm. Following the approach set out in
this article is more likely to accord with what actually happens in the care of
incompetent people than in the orthodox legal principles focussing on best interests
and the right of autonomy.
We have elevated autonomy to such a status that the other ways of relating to the
world outside the rational have been ignored by the law. We are not respecting the
humanity of incompetent people by attaching no legal weight to their feelings and
wishes, beyond what they may reveal about a person's best interests.
Researchers that have talked to those suffering dementia have reported that what
was most important to those persons was that they were regarded as of value and of
use. Sufferers reported their major concern being not so much a loss of cognition or
identity, but the loss of value and the loss of relationships with other. 169 Our legal
system, with its emphasis on rationality and individuality, reinforces these concerns
rather than seeks to address them. Rational decisions are not the only forms of human
interaction that deserve protection and respect.
Professor D.H. Smith writes of dementia:
[A]Ithough cancer kills you, ... it doesn't remove your very humanity. ... It
doesn't turn you into a vegetable .... All diseases are depersonalizing to some
extent. But you're still human .... But a person with a serious dementia is no
longer human. He's a vegetable. That's devastating. Fearsome. Terrifying, to
anyone who's ever seen it--the thought that it could happen to you. 170
Such a view that a person with serious dementia is just a vegetable is repugnant.
The lives with those with dementia are richer than is commonly supposed by those
looking at the outside. '71 The law must find ways of interacting with those who have
169. Els Steeman, Jan Godderis, Mieke Grypdonck, Nele De Bal & Bernadette Dierckx De
Casterld, Living with Dementia from the Perspective of Older People: Is it a Positive Story?, I 1
AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 119 (2007).
170. David H. Smith, Seeing and Knowing Dementia, in DEMENTIA AND AGING: ETHICS,
VALUES, AND POLICY CHOICES 45, 51 (Robert H. Binstock, Stephen G. Post, & Peter J.
Whitehouse eds., 1992).
171. Jaworska, supra note 141, at 130.
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lost competence. We can start by valuing the non-rational and listening to the
demented. Listening hard.

